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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Conclusions.

1. Although there is little reliable intelligence directly indicating how the USSR and Communist China arrive at the unified policy they are currently following, it appears probable that (a) policies are formed for the most part through consultation; (b) China would normally conform to Soviet wishes; and (c) although the USSR undoubtedly dominates the alliance, it must normally take the wishes of China into consideration. In most matters of common concern, especially where the immediate aspirations of China as a nation are not directly involved, Communist China will be guided by the USSR.

2. Where Soviet aims conflict with Chinese aspiration (e.g., the control of border regions, especially Manchuria; Soviet domination of the Chinese party, government, and army; China's participation in Soviet-sponsored wars; and leadership in Communist movements in the Far East), the USSR will, for the present, make some concessions and compromises. If an impasse should be reached in negotiations, China would not necessarily yield to Soviet dictates but would reach a decision after weighing the advantages of maintaining the alliance against the consequences of yielding on the point at issue. China would have some latitude in making

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such a decision because (a) the retention of China as a political and military partner is almost as important to the USSR as the friendship of the USSR is to China; (b) if China wished to do so, it could face the USSR with the choice of yielding (or compromising) on the point at issue or of making war on China with consequences that might eventually be disastrous for the USSR; and (c) if China openly broke with the USSR, it would be in position to turn to the West, with fair prospects of receiving aid.

3. The present capability of Peiping for independent action is being steadily reduced through Soviet penetration of Chinese party, government, and army organizations. Unless the Chinese take steps to reverse this trend, the USSR will probably succeed eventually in gaining complete control over China.